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Interpreting the Term Structure
of Interest Rates
This Weekly Letter is adapted from the discus-
sion at the Conference on Macroeconomic
Stabilization Policy held at Stanford University
on March 5 and 6, 1993. The conference was
jointly sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank
ofSan Francisco and the Center for Economic
Policy Research at Stanford.
The term structure of interest rates-sometimes
called the yield curve-refers to the curve traced
out by interest rates on securities as their ma-
turity ranges from short to long-term. Typically,
interest rates on long-term securities are higher
than rates on short-term securities, so the term
structure generally slopes upward. But some-
times, long-term rates are lower than short-term
rates; in this case, the yield curve is described
as "inverted."
The term structure of interest rates is important
because it contains information about the mar-
ket's forecasts of future inflation and interest rates
as well as about its perception of risk. For exam-
ple, in recent months, long-term interest rates
have fallen relative to short-term rates. To some
extent, this may reflect beliefs that inflation will be
lower in the future, that deficit reduction will re-
duce future short-term real interest rates, or that
risks associated with long-term investments may
have diminished. If properly understood, this
information can help investors and policymakers
formulate long-term plans.
This Weekly Letter explains how to interpret the
information in the yield curve. It reviews the ba-
sic theory of the term structure, discusses the em-
pirical importance of various theoretical factors,
provides some insight into the events ofthe 1980s,
and interprets the recent decline in long-term
interest rates.
The theory of the term structure
The simplest theory ofthe term structure is
known as the Expectations Hypothesis. Accord-
ing to this theory, the expected return earned by
holding long and short-term bonds over the same
period of time should be the same. For example,
suppose an investor has a choice between two
long-term investment strategies, either to buy
a long-term bond and hold it until it matures,
or to roll over a sequence of short-term bills. If
investors were not concerned about risk, they
would choose the strategy which pays the higher
expected return. Then, in equilibrium, the two
strategies would have the same expected return.
For example, if the expected return on long-term
bonds were greater than the expected return on
rolling over short-term bonds, investors would
sell short-term bonds and buy long-term bonds.
This would increase yields on short-term bonds,
while the return on long-term bonds would fall.
Investors would continue this operation until
expected returns were equalized.
Similarly, suppose an investor has a choice
between two short-term investment strategies,
either to buy a 3-month bill and hold it until it
matures, or to buy a long-term bond, hold it for
three months, and then sell it. The Expectations
Hypothesis predicts that the interest rate on
3-month bills should be the same as the expected
return on holding the long-term bond three
months. Therefore, the difference between actual
holding returns on long and short bonds, which
is called the "excess holding return:' should be
unpredictable.
According to the expectations theory, the shape
of the yield curve is determined by expectations
about future changes in shorHerm interestrates.
In particular, the term structure slopes upward
when short rates are expected to rise, and it
slopes downward when short rates are expected
to fall. To see why, suppose that future short-term
rates are expected to rise. Ifthe yield curve were
flat, investors could make more money by rolling
over short-term bills than by holding long-term
bonds. To eliminate this arbitrage opportunity, the
long-termbond yield must be greater than the cur-
rent short-term rate. In th is case, the yield curve
must slope upward.
While the Expectations Hypothesis certainly













If the Expectations Hypothesis were correct, the
long-term risk premium would be zero at all
dates in the sample, and variation in the long-
term real interest rate would be due entirely to
variation in the expected rollover return on bills.
In contrast, the figure shows that most of the var-
iation in the long-term interest rate is due to
variation in the risk premium. Relatively little is
due to the expected rollover return. Thus the
shape ofthe yield curve appears to depend pri-
marily on time-varying risk premia. The factors
emphasized by the expectations theory appear
to be of secondary importance.
output, and inflation. The short-term interest rate
is the 3-month Treasury bill rate, and the long-
term interest rate is the 10-year Treasury bond
rate. Output is measured by per capita GDp, and
inflation is measured by the percent change in
the implicit GDP deflator. I estimated the model
using quarterly data over the period 1959 to
1992. The results are shown in the figure, which
shows the implied long-term risk premia as well
as estimates of the long-term real interest rate.
The distance between the two curves is the ex-
pected real return earned by rolling over short-
term bonds.
Riskpremia vary countercyclically; output tends
to be below trend when risk is high. Holding risk
constant, the real rollover return varies procycli-
cally. It tends to be higher than average when
output is above trend and risk is low. Yield
spreads are useful for predicting risk premia, but
they do not help to forecast the real rollover re-
turn on bills. Thus the ability of yield spreads to
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Time-varying term premia
To induce risk-averse investors to hold long
bonds for one quarter, the expected holding
return on long bonds must include a one-quarter
risk premium. To induce risk-averse investors to
hold long bonds until maturity, long bonds must
offer a sequence of quarterly risk premia, cover-
ing the period from now until maturity. The yield
to maturity on long bonds includes a long-term
risk premium which is equal to the present dis-
counted value of the sequence of expected short-
term risk premia.
The presence of a risk premium complicates
the interpretation of the term structure, since an
upward sloping yield curve might indicate that
markets expect short-term rates to rise or that
there is greater uncertainty about the future. Sim-
ilarly, if the risk premium is large enough, the
yield curve can slope upward even when short-
term rates are expected to fall. Thus it is impor-
tant to account for time-varying risk premia
when interpreting the term structure.
My forecasting model is adapted from Fuhrer and
Moore (1993). It predicts future excess holding
returns using past observations of short-term bill
rates, realized excess holding returns, detrended
One can interpret the predictable variation in ex-
cess holding returns as evidence of variation in
short-term risk premia. Thus one can estimate the
long-term risk premium by constructing a fore-
casting model, generating forecasts of excess
holding returns over long horizons, and then
discounting those forecasts back to the present.
believe that it is oversimplified. In particular,
while the Expectations Hypothesis implies that
expected holding returns on long and short-term
bonds should be the same, empirical studies
show that there are predictable differences. This
suggests that the expectations theory leaves out
an important ingredient. Many economists
believe that the missing ingredient is risk. When
interest rates change, the value of pre-existing
long-term bonds also changes, and the longer the
time to maturity the greater is the capital gain or
loss. Thus long-term bonds are subject to greater
capital risk than short-term bonds. In addition,
some bonds are subject to default risk, although
this does not apply to Treasury bonds. Since
many investors dislike risk, they require a higher
expected return-a risk premium-on long-term
bonds.forecast output fluctuations (e.g., Huh 1993) ap-
pears to be related to uncertainty about future
interest rate fluctuations.
Events of the1980s
During the 1980s there was a substantial increase
in long-term interest rates, and most of this was
due to an increase in risk premia. For example,
during the 1960s and 1970s, the average long-
term real interest rate was approximately 1 per-
cent, and risk premia were small, averaging
- 0.3 percentage points. Negative risk premia
may seem anomalous, but they can occur when
investors believe that there is a small chance of
making a large capital gain on long bonds. Dur-
ing the 1980s, the risk premium averaged 2 per-
centage points, and average long-term real rates
increased to 4.1 percent.
What caused such a large increase in risk? The
timing suggests that it might be related to uncer-
tainty about disinflation. Risk premia began to
rise around the middle of 1979 and reached a
peak in the third quarter of 1982. This roughly
coincides with Chairman Volcker's efforts to drive
down the inflation rate. At the time, there was a
great deal of uncertainty about how long the Fed-
eral Reserve would persist in its efforts to reduce
inflation. As unemployment began to rise, many
people believed that the Federal Reserve might
reverse course in order to stabilize employment.
Since the commitment to disinflation was in
doubt, it became very difficult to predict the path
of inflation and thus very risky to hold long-term
nominal bonds. Risk premia rose dramatically to
compensate investors for the unusually high
degree of uncertainty about inflation.
In 1982 the inflation rate fell from roughly 8 per-
cent to around 4 percent, and it remained
around 4 percent for the rest of the decade. Risk
premia declined more gradually, which suggests
that the Federal Reserve's steady inflation policy
gained credibility only gradually. After 1986, the
risk premium decline to roughly 0.6 percent.
Although the likelihood of a return to high infla-
tion was relatively low, unlikely events do some-
times occur.Thus the risk premium on long bonds
remained higher than in the 1960s and 1970s.
The evidence suggests that our temporary expe-
rience wit~ high inflation in the late 1970s and
. early 1980s had a lasting effect on long-term real
interest rates.
Recent events
Over the last few months the term structure of
interest rates has become flatter, as long-term
yields have fallen while short-term rates were
more or less unchanged. In particular, the
spread between 10-year Treasury bond rates and
3-month Treasury bill rates fell by roughly 40 ba-
sis points. Complete data for the first quarter are
not yet available, so one can make only rough
guesses about the factors underlying this change.
Based on staff estimates ofthe missing data, my
model suggests that this reflects roughly equal
declines in risk and expected short-term real
rates. For example, in the first quarter of 1993,
the expected rollover return on short-term bills
fell by 18 basis points, while the risk premium on
long bonds declined by 11 basis points. The long-
term real interest rate fell to 0.5 percent, a level
not seen since 1977.
The timing of the change in the yield curve sug-
gests thatit was driven by news about deficit
reduction. For example, the biggest drop in long-
term rates occurred after President Clinton's eco-
nomic address, in which he outlined his strategy
for reducing the federal budget deficit. This
reduces long-term interest rates in two ways.
Deficit reduction increases national saving and
thus eases pressure on short-term real interest
rates. Deficit reduction also reduces the risk of a
return to high inflation by slowing the growth of
nominal aggregate demand in the intermediate
run and by reducing the likelihood that the gov-
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The FRBSF Weekly Letter appears on an abbreviated schedule in June, July, August, and December.